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FAMILY REHABILITATION, INC. 
V. AZAR: CARING FOR THE 
CARETAKERS - A PATH FOR 
PROVIDERS TRAPPED IN THE 
MEDICARE APPEALS BACKLOG 
BY: MATTHEW MORRIS* 
In Family Rehabilitation, Inc. v. Azar1, the United States District Court for 
the Northern District of Texas held that the withholding of Medicare payments 
by federal health care programs to effectuate the recoupment of alleged 
overpayments infringes on the due process rights of a health care entity. In the 
June 2018 opinion, the court concluded that the plaintiff, Family Rehabilitation 
Clinic, demonstrated both the required standards for a procedural due process 
claim as well as the threat of “irreparable harm”, and thus granted their motion 
for a preliminary injunction.2 This ruling prevented the defendants, Alex Azar3 
and Seema Verma4, “from withholding Medicare payments and receivables to 
Family Rehab to effectuate the recoupment of the alleged overpayments,” before 
the plaintiffs were afforded their full due process rights. The court’s decision was 
correct and implicates policy concerns that will not be solved by throwing more 
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Law.  I would like to thank the professors and teachers that have dedicated their 
time to push me to become a more thoughtful student and person. I would also like 
to thank the editors from the Journal of Health Care Law and Policy for their 
extensive review and constructive feedback. I dedicate this Note to my family and 
friends for their endless support and encouragement throughout my time in law 
school; it has meant the world.  
 1. No. 3:17-CV-3008-K, 2018 WL 3155911, (N.D. Tex. June 28, 2018). 
 2. Id. In fact, since the first drafting of this case note and its publication, the court returned another 
favorable opinion for the health care providers by granting a permanent injunction in favor of Family 
Rehab. See Family Rehabilitation, Inc. v. Azar, 2020 WL 230615  (N.D. Tex., 2020). The court’s decision 
to ultimately grant a permanent injunction only serves to strengthen the case made in this note that the 
court’s first decision was correctly decided, and that health care providers should use the argument’s 
adopted by the court to protect themselves from improper recoupments. 
 3. Mr. Azar was sued in his official capacity as the Secretary for the Department of Health and 
Human Services (HHS). 
 4. Administrator for the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS). 
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money to the Office of Medicare Hearings and Appeals (OMHA).5 In reaching 
its conclusion, the court correctly determined that Medicare payments are a 
property interest in the context of due process proceedings and consequently 
ensured protections for health care providers who base their business models on 
these payments.6 The reasoning found in this seemingly innocuous slip opinion 
can serve as protection for health care providers mired in the Medicare appeals 
process and thus illustrates the process by which providers in other federal 
districts can protect themselves from the Department of Health and Human 
Service’s (“HHS”) improper means of recoupment during post-payment 
reviews.7 
I. THE CASE 
A. Factual History 
Family Rehabilitation, Inc. (Family Rehab) is a small, Medicare-certified 
home health agency located in Waxahachie, Texas.8 Before the action in this 
case, Family Rehab provided services to over 289 patients across all of its 
facilities, with its revenue stream primarily consisting of Medicare 
reimbursements.9 During a post-payment review process, a third-party 
contractor, known as a Zone Program Integrity Contractor (“ZPIC”), determined, 
from a randomized sampling of claims, that the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid 
Services (“CMS”) had overpaid Family Rehab by over $7.8 million.10 Family 
Rehab requested a redetermination by a Medicare Contractor (MAC), which 
concluded that the initial determination was correct on all but one of the claims 
and thus lowered the amount owed in overpayments to $7.6 million.11 
Family Rehab appealed this redetermination to a Qualified Independent 
Contractor (QIC), which affirmed the claims, and Family Rehab was 
subsequently sent a demand letter for the remaining $7.6 owed in 
overpayments.12 Family Rehab filed a timely appeal to an Administrative Law 
Judge (ALJ) but did not receive an evidentiary hearing within the statutorily 
mandated 90 days.13 During this waiting process, CMS began recouping the 
alleged overpayments by withholding Medicare reimbursements for current 
 
 5. See infra Section IV.C. 
 6. See infra Section IV.A. 
 7. See infra Section IV.B. 
 8. Family Rehab., Inc. v. Azar, No. 3:17-CV-3008-K, 2018 WL 3155911, at *1 (N.D. Tex. June 28, 
2018). 
 9. Family Rehab., Inc., 2018 WL 3155911, at *1. 
 10. Id. at *5–6. 
 11. Id. at *6. 
 12. Id. at *6. 
 13. Id. at *6. 
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Family Rehab clients.14 This waiting period proved extremely detrimental to 
Family Rehab, as the health agency was forced to lay off over 88% of its 
workforce and terminate care to 281 of 289 patients.15 
B. Procedural History 
The United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas first 
ruled on the dispute between Family Rehab and CMS in late 2017,16 holding that 
42 U.S.C § 405 precluded Family Rehab from bringing its challenge against 
“Medicare’s administrative action.”17 On appeal, the Fifth Circuit Court of 
Appeals reversed and remanded the lower court’s opinion regarding Family 
Rehab’s due process complaint, yet affirmed the decision in all other respects.18 
In reaching its decision, the Fifth Circuit agreed with Family Rehab’s 
argument that this action was outside, or collateral to, the substantive limits of 
the guiding statute.19 The court reasoned that preclusion would be proper if 
Family Rehab was challenging the substantive decision underlying its Medicare 
claim.20 However, because Family Rehab’s claim was “entirely collateral,” and 
one where full relief could not be granted at a post-deprivation hearing, the court 
remanded the case to the lower court.21 On remand, the United States District 
Court for the Northern District of Texas initially granted Family Rehab’s motion 
for a preliminary restraining order and enjoined CMS and HHS from continuing 
to withhold Family Rehab’s Medicare payments.22 The court held hearings for 
Family Rehab’s preliminary injunction before deciding the current case.23 Since 
the first authoring of this case note, the court returned another decision in this 
matter granting permanent injunctive relief in favor of Family Rehab.24 
II. LEGAL BACKGROUND 
To better understand how the court reached its decision in the present case, 
it is imperative to first review the means by which the plaintiff can bring this suit. 
This legal background section will thus first address the concerns with procedural 
due process and the grant for injunctive relief. Next, this section will delve into 
 
 14. Id. at *6. 
 15. Id. at *6–7. 
 16. Family Rehab., Inc. v. Hargan, No. 3:17-cv-3008-K, 2017 WL 6761769 (N.D. Tex. Nov. 2, 
2017). 
 17. Family Rehab., Inc., 2017 WL 6761769 at *2. 
 18. Family Rehab., Inc. v. Azar, 886 F.3d 496 (5th Cir. 2018). 
 19. 886 F.3d 496, 503 (5th Cir. 2018). 
 20. See id. at 504 (dismissing the claim for lack of subject matter jurisdiction). 
 21. Id. at 507. 
 22. Family Rehab., Inc. v. Azar, No. 3:17-cv-3008-K, 2018 WL 2670730 (N.D. Tex. June 4, 2018). 
 23. Id. 
 24. Family Rehab., Inc. v. Azar, 2020 WL 230615  (N.D. Tex., 2020). 
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the Medicare statutes and case law that authorize and outline the process of post-
payment review. Further, this section will focus on how ongoing and recently 
decided cases highlight diverse issues with the Medicare appeals backlog and 
finally address judicially-created solutions to the problem. 
A. Procedural Due Process 
1. Mathews v. Eldridge 
In Mathews v. Eldridge25, the Supreme Court narrowly held that the 
government is not required to hold evidentiary hearings prior to terminating a 
person’s disability benefits, and that the administrative procedures employed by 
the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare (presently known as the 
Department of Health and Human Services) for these disability termination 
proceedings fully comported with due process.26 In Eldridge, respondent 
Eldridge received disability payments from the government, as administered by 
a state agency, beginning in 1968 and continuing for the several years leading up 
to the action in the case.27 However, after consulting with Eldridge’s physicians 
and evaluating a survey he submitted, the state agency revoked his disability 
status and began the process to terminate his benefits with the Social Security 
Administration.28 
Eldridge then circumvented the administrative appeals process and brought 
action against the Department, alleging that its procedures violated his due 
process rights by failing to provide him the opportunity for an evidentiary 
hearing before terminating his benefits.29 The District Court ruled that the 
administrative procedures utilized for these proceedings violated Eldridge’s due 
process rights.30 On appeal, the Fourth Circuit relied upon the reasoning of the 
District Court and upheld the lower court’s ruling.31 The Supreme Court granted 
certiorari and subsequently reversed the decisions of the two lower courts, ruling 
that the Department did not infringe upon Eldridge’s due process rights.32 
While inherent differences exist between disability payments for 
individuals and Medicare payments for health care agencies, the Court developed 
a general standard in Eldridge for determining whether the government serves 
adequate due process in similar deprivation proceedings.33 Writing for the 
 
 25. 424 U.S. 319 (1976). 
 26. Id. at 349. 
 27. Id. at 323.   
 28. Id. at 323–24.   
 29. Id. at 324–25.   
 30. Id. at 326. 
 31. Id. at 327. 
 32. Id. 
 33. See id. at 335.   
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majority, Justice Powell clarified the important three-part test used to determine 
if the government afforded a party their right to due process: 
 
“First, the private interest that will be affected by the official action; 
second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through 
the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or 
substitute procedural safeguards; and finally, the Government’s 
interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and 
administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural 
requirement would entail.”34 
 
The Eldridge court further elaborated on indicia that a court may look for 
to adjudge if these factors are met in a case. Referencing the Court’s decision in 
Goldberg v. Kelly35, Justice Powell clarified that “the degree of potential 
deprivation that may be created by a particular decision is a factor to be 
considered in assessing the validity of any administrative decision-making 
process.”36 The Court emphasized the importance of the government maintaining 
a fair and reliable procedural process when making these determinations.37 
Further, Eldridge addressed the public interest at stake, the final factor in 
the due process calculus.38 The Court spoke to the importance of preserving the 
public’s interest in efficient proceedings to lower administrative costs, while also 
ensuring judicial intervention in administrative action be used sparingly.39 The 
Court ultimately held that the Social Security Administration followed proper 
procedure and that Eldridge was not entitled to an evidentiary hearing prior to 
the termination of his disability benefits.40 Nonetheless, the factors laid out by 
the Court have guided further judicial interpretation of due process claims across 
varying contexts. 
2. The Fifth Circuit’s View on Injunctive Relief 
The judicial process can be long and fraught with delays and continuations, 
often putting the very same private interests the courts are protecting at risk. At 
times, courts look to prevent such administrative injustice through the granting 
 
 34. Id. at 335.   
 35. Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970). 
 36. 424 U.S. at 341. 
 37. See id. at 343 (noting that “[a]n additional factor to be considered here is the fairness and 
reliability of the existing pre-termination procedures, and the probable value, if any, of additional 
procedural safeguards.”). 
 38. Id. at 347. 
 39. Id. at 348 (“The ultimate balance involves a determination as to when, under our constitutional 
system, judicial-type procedures must be imposed upon administrative action to assure fairness.”). 
 40. Id. at 349. 
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of injunctive relief. This section  addresses the approach embraced by the Fifth 
Circuit in such instances. 
The first rule of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (FRCP) commands 
for the ensuing rules to be administered in pursuit of a “just, speedy, and 
inexpensive determination of every action and proceeding.”41 While not codified 
in the FRCP, courts have utilized injunctive relief to preclude substantial and 
detrimental outcomes for plaintiffs as they proceed through the judicial system 
awaiting their final judgements.42 The judicial mechanism allows for courts to 
properly adjudicate claims based on the merits of the case, and protects against 
outside factors that can have a tendency to persuade the decision-making of the 
court. 
In examining how the Fifth Circuit has previously dealt with injunctive 
relief, courts have spoken to the requirements that the moving party must 
demonstrate to succeed in a motion for preliminary injunctive relief. In Canal 
Authority of State of Fla. v. Callaway43, the Fifth Circuit heard the appeal of a 
motion for injunctive relief that sought to help preserve a rare species of trees in 
the area by preventing the defendants from lowering the water levels in a nearby 
lake.44 The court held that the four relevant factors in determining whether to 
grant a preliminary injunction were: 
 
“(1) a substantial likelihood that plaintiff will prevail on 
the merits, (2) a substantial threat that plaintiff will suffer 
irreparable injury if the injunction is not granted, (3) that the 
threatened injury to plaintiff outweighs the threatened harm the 
injunction may do to defendant, and (4) that granting the 
preliminary injunction will not disserve the public interest.”45 
 
While the specific factual circumstances and ultimate holding in a case 
concerning endangered trees situated on a flood plain are not particularly relevant 
to the adjudication of Medicare appeals, the four factors established by the Fifth 
 
 41. FED. R. CIV. P. 1. The Rule states in part that, “[The rules] should be construed, administered, 
and employed by the court and the parties to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of 
every action and proceeding.” 
 42. Family Rehab., Inc. v. Azar, No. 3:17-CV-3008-K, 2018 WL 3155911, at *7–8 (N.D. Tex. June 
28, 2018) (“‘The purpose of a preliminary injunction is to preserve the status quo and thus prevent 
irreparable harm until the respective rights of the parties can be ascertained during a trial on the 
merits.’; Serna v. Tex. Dep’t of State Health Servs., Vital Statistics Unit, No. 1-15-CV-446-RP, 2015 WL 
6118623, at 13 (W.D. Tex. Oct. 16, 2015) (quoting Exhibitors Poster Exch., Inc. v. Nat’l Screen Serv. 
Corp., 441 F.2d 560, 560 (5th Cir. 1971)).” 
 43. Canal Auth. of State of Fla., 489 F.2d 567 (5th Cir. 1974). 
 44. Id. at 569–70. 
 45. Id. at 572-73 (citing Di Giorgio v. Causey, 488 F.2d 527 (5th Cir. 1973); Blackshear Residents 
Org. v. Romney, 472 F.2d 1197 (5th Cir. 1973)). 
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Circuit in Canal Authority of State of Fla. are vital in shaping the Circuit’s 
common law and procedural due process jurisprudence.46 
In applying the four-factor test articulated in Canal Authority of State of 
Fla., courts are tasked with weighing the relative probability of success of the 
movant’s claims on the merits when deciding whether to grant injunctive relief.47 
The Fifth Circuit continues to emphasize the movant’s burden of demonstrating 
a high likelihood of success on the merits.48 This standard affords courts the 
ability to provide relief to the movant without causing unnecessary judicial action 
or hindrance of a swift and final ending. The standard guarantees fairness for all 
parties involved in the proceedings and allows the court to weigh factors, such 
as severity of injury, on a sliding scale to ultimately decide when to rule on a 
motion.49  Finally, courts may look prospectively in determining whether awards 
resulting from the adjudication of the case are sufficient to make amends for the 
harm caused by refusing to grant the motion for injunction.50 
In the context of proceedings involving Medicare payments, the Fifth 
Circuit has recently spoken to the specific factors relevant in determining 
whether injunctive relief is proper. In Maxmed Healthcare, Inc. v. Burwell,51 the 
District Court for the Western District of Texas held in denying plaintiff’s motion 
for preliminary injunction that “[i]n the Medicare withholding context, going out 
of business can be sufficient evidence of irreparable injury.”52 In weighing the 
relevant factors to determine whether to grant the motion for preliminary 
injunction, the court ultimately concluded that the health care provider had not 
fully explored the feasibility of a payment plan with the Secretary of HHS.53 
Much like Family Rehabilitation Inc, the plaintiff in Maxmed was a Medicare-
certified home health care provider located in Texas that faced substantial debt 
caused by a post-payment investigation and statistical sampling.54 While much 
of the case centers around the methodology of extrapolation for reviewed claims 
to assess the full monetary penalty assessed by the Secretary, the factors relied 
upon in the order for preliminary injunction are helpful for understanding future 
Medicare repayment cases.55 Of note, the Secretary was ultimately successful on 
 
 46. Id. 
 47. State of Tex. v. Seatrain Intern., 518 F.2d 175, 180 (5th Cir. 1975). 
 48. Id. 
 49. Id. 
 50. Humana, Inc. v. Avram A. Jacobson, 804 F.2d 1390, 1394 (5th Cir. 1980) (“The plaintiff need 
show only a significant threat of injury from the impending action,20 that the injury is imminent, and that 
money damages would not fully repair the harm.”). 
 51. No. SA:14-CV-988-DAE, 2015 WL 1310567 (W.D. Tex. Mar. 23, 2015). 
 52. Id. at *6. 
 53. Id. at *7. 
 54. Maxmed Healthcare, Inc. v. Burwell, 152 F.Supp.3d 619 (W.D. Tex. 2016). In particular, the 
plaintiff’s owed over $773,967 after the review from the MAC. 
 55. See id; supra note 49. 
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a motion for summary judgement in a ruling that was subsequently affirmed by 
the Fifth Circuit.56 
B. Medicare and the Courts: Recent and Ongoing Challenges Against the 
Program 
The current situation with the backlog in Medicare appeals has produced 
relevant litigation, which derive from recent agency actions effectuated by HHS 
that may have aggravated the problem, as well as proposed solutions for the 
federal government to consider in moving forward. These solutions may lead to 
a growing dichotomy between addressing the problem at its root source in the 
appellate process proscribed to HHS and  passing on the final decision-making 
power in these appeals to the federal judiciary. 
1. Background: Medicare Appeals Process and the Mounting Backlog of 
Appeals 
Signed into law as a provision of the Social Security Act in 1965, the 
Medicare program helps pay for the costs of covered medical procedures for 
individuals who meet program requirements.57 This initial determination on a 
claim is conducted by different Medicare Administrative Contractors (MACs) 
that process the claims using statutory guidelines.58 Beyond the MACs, there are 
additional steps in the appellate process that a claimant can utilize, beginning 
with evidentiary hearings before an ALJ and ultimately ending with the 
Departmental Appeals Board (DAB) and the Medicare Appeals Council.59 There 
are also statutory guidelines in place to help ensure the efficient and timely 
review of claims at each stage of the appeals process.60 
While there are statutory standards guiding this process, the process of 
appealing a claim recently became more time consuming than the original 
framework that was set forth in the statutory guidelines. As of September 1, 
2017, there were 595,000 outstanding claims for adjudication.61 Further, a party 
waiting for his or her appeal to be heard by an ALJ could be stuck waiting for 
three to five years.62 HHS did not always face this daunting Medicare appeals 
backlog; however the process has slowed considerably since the introductions of 
 
 56. Maxmed Healthcare, Inc. v. Burwell, 152 F.Supp.3d 619 (W.D. Tex. 2016); Maxmed Healthcare, 
Inc. v. Price, 860 F.3d 335 (5th Cir. 2017). 
 57. Family Rehab. Inc. v. Azar, No. 3:17-CV-3008-K, 2018 WL 3155911, at *1 (N.D. Tex. June 28, 
2018). 
 58. See  U.S.C. 42 § 1395kk-1 (2015) 
 59. Am. Hosp. Ass’n v. Burwell, 812 F.3d 183, 185–86 (D.C. Cir. 2016). 
 60. See id. at 186 (detailing the different statutory deadlines associated with the Medicare appeals 
process, including but not limited to the timeframes for MAC, QIC, and DAB decision, but also the 
penalties for failing to meet those deadlines). 
 61. Family Rehab., Inc., 2018 WL 3155911, at *2. 
 62. Id. at *2. 
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the Medicare Recovery Audit Program and Recovery Audit Contractors 
(RACs).63 The program was aimed at stopping and containing overpayments and 
underpayments on claims, as well as recouping the overpayments from the 
providers and beneficiaries.64 The Medicare Recovery program has done good 
things for HHS, but it has also created a heavy load of new appeals for RACs to 
determine.65 
2. The American Hospital Association Saga 
There is a no more instructive window into the realm of Medicare payments 
and the appeals process than the examination of the ongoing litigation involving 
the American Hospital Association and HHS. In 2014, the U.S. District Court for 
the District of Columbia (the district court) issued the initial decision in this 
matter with American Hospital Ass’n v. Burwell.66 Plaintiffs sought a writ of 
mandamus against HHS to compel the agency to enforce the statutory guidelines 
of the Medicare Act by adjudicating their respective administrative appeals.67 
The district court ruled in favor of HHS, ultimately acknowledging that the court 
did not have mandamus jurisdiction.68 Further, while the appeals system was not 
completing its proper functions, the district court held that only Congress could 
offer the proper resolution.69 
Following the district court’s decision, the D.C. Circuit, in a unanimous 
2016 opinion, reversed and remanded the decision back to the district court.70 
The D.C. Circuit held that the statutory guidelines presented firmer guidance than 
the lower court’s decision, and that escalation was an inadequate remedy in the 
immediate case.71 Answering the D.C. Circuit’s remand, the district court 
subsequently issued a succinct memorandum opinion that directly addressed 
strategies HHS should pursue to efficiently solve the backlog problem.72 
After addressing both parties’ contentions, the district court held that HHS 
should strive to fully ameliorate the appeals backlog meaning a one-hundred 
 
 63. Am. Hosp. Ass’n v. Burwell, 812 F.3d 183, 186–87 (D.C. Cir. 2016). 
 64. 812 F.3d at 186. 
 65. See id. at 186–87 (identifying $2.3 billion in overpayments in the fiscal year 2012, and $3.65 
billion in overpayments in the fiscal year 2013. While identifying claims that were overpaid is positive 
for the Department, these new claims can be appealed using the same process as a regular underpayment 
appeal and have added a volume of new cases to the process). 
 66. 76 F.Supp.3d 43 (D.D.C. 2014). 
 67. Am. Hosp. Ass’n, 76 F.Supp.3d at 48 (D.D.C. 2014). 
 68. Id. at 56. 
 69. Id. 
 70. Am. Hosp. Ass’n v. Burwell, 812 F.3d 183, 185 (D.C. Cir. 2016). 
 71. Am. Hosp. Ass’n, 812 F.3d at 192. 
 72. Am. Hosp. Ass’n v. Burwell, No. CV 14-851 (JEB), 2016 WL 7076983, at *1 (D.D.C. Dec. 5, 
2016), reconsideration denied, No. CV 14-851 (JEB), 2017 WL 6209175 (D.D.C. Jan. 4, 2017), vacated 
sub nom; Am. Hosp. Ass’n v. Price, 867 F.3d 160 (D.C. Cir. 2017), vacated and remanded sub nom. Am. 
Hosp. Ass’n v. Price, 867 F.3d 160 (D.C. Cir. 2017). 
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percent reduction in backlogged appeals by 2021, with remaining claims subject 
to declaratory judgement upon the claimant’s petition.73 On appeal in the D.C. 
Circuit, a divided three judge panel directly addressed the guideline structure 
ordered by the district court.74 With their opening line, “Ought implies can,” the 
court introduced the premise of the remainder of their opinion at its very 
beginning.75 
Following this opening salvo, the court addressed the Secretary’s argument 
that the judicial guidelines imposed impossible measures and, as such, would 
force the Secretary to bend or break the law to meet the rigid January 1, 2021 
date.76 The D.C. Circuit remanded the district court’s decision to further consider 
the Secretary’s dilemma, with an emphasis on establishing and evaluating the 
plausibility for the Secretary to meet deadlines using methods that can be 
mandated, as opposed to those measures that are out of the Secretary’s control.77 
Most recently, the district court answered the D.C. Circuit’s demand for a 
permissible solution for the Secretary to fix the backlog problem.78 In light of 
new appropriations from Congress that allow the Secretary to properly address 
the backlog at the OMHA level, the district court ruled to reissue a similar tiered 
deadline approach that the court previously set forth in their 2017 decision.79 
While it is likely the final chapter in this epic judicial saga, the district court’s 
opinion identifies the government actor who may be best equipped to end this 
long and winding road. 
A primary factor influencing the district court’s holding was the passage by 
Congress of appropriations for HHS, which allowed the Secretary to drastically 
increase its adjudicatory output, thus making the seemingly impossible task of 
eliminating the backlog no longer out of reach.80 Addressing this appropriations 
legislation, the court explained that while such a funding increase may normally 
persuade the court to refuse to issue a writ, this appropriation would simply make 
 
 73. Id. at *5–6. 
 74. Am. Hosp. Ass’n v. Price, 867 F.3d 160 (D.D.C. 2017). 
 75. Am. Hosp. Ass’n, 867 F.3d at 161 (D.D.C. 2017). 
 76. Id. at 167 (“The Secretary essentially asserted that the timetable placed him between a rock and 
a hard place: either violate the Medicare statute by settling reimbursement claims en masse without regard 
for their merit, or violate the Court’s mandamus order by missing the court-ordered deadlines.” 
 77. Id. at 169–70. 
 78. Am. Hosp. Ass’n v. Azar, No. CV 14-851 (JEB), 2018 WL 5723141 (D.D.C. Nov. 1, 2018). This 
is the most recent update in the case as of the drafting of this case note. 
 79. See Am. Hosp. Ass’n, No. CV 14-851 (JEB), 2018 WL 5723141, at *3 (changing the framework 
for the deadline to one year later than was previously set, thus changing the final deadline for 100% of the 
backlog to be adjudicated by January 1, 2022). 
 80. Id. at *2 (“On March 23, 2018, Congress appropriated for that purpose $182.3 million, which the 
agency projects will ‘more than doubl[e] its FY 2017 disposition capacity.’ Id. In fact, HHS now ‘projects 
that, at current funding levels, OMHA’s adjudication capacity will increase over FY 2017 levels by 23% 
in FY 2018, 42% in FY 2019, 108% in FY 2020, and approximately 122% in FY 2021 and 2022,’ meaning 
that ‘the Secretary will be able to eliminate the backlog entirely in FY 2022.’”) Id. 
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compliance with the law possible and that this possibility was adequate to decide 
against issuing a mandamus order.81 Only time, and the D.C. Circuit, will tell if 
this deadline proves feasible or, perhaps more importantly, judicially 
enforceable. 
3. A Split on Escalation? — The Fourth Circuit Diverges on the Backlog 
The Fourth Circuit reached a contrary holding when confronted with a 
similar case involving health care providers mired in the Medicare appeals 
backlog. In Cumberland County Hospital System v. Burwell82, the Fourth 
Circuit’s ruling encompassed a troubling determination directly affecting the 
interests of private health care providers as it related to the appeals backlog. Cape 
Fear Health Systems (the System), based out of eastern North Carolina, brought 
the action in the federal district court seeking a writ of mandamus to order the 
Secretary of HHS (the Secretary) to assign the System’s appeals to an ALJ at 
OMHA.83 The System’s claim dated back to several denials of payment by the 
Secrerary from 2012 and 2013; as of late 2014, the System had hundreds of 
claims awaiting an evidentiary hearing before the ALJ with the total dollar 
amount for the claims reaching $12.3 million.84 
In a pretrial brief, the Secretary noted that, as of the filing, over 800,000 
appeals were awaiting adjudication, amounting to ten times the work that could 
be accomplished annually at the Secretary’s present funding levels.85  The 
System’s argument in favor of a grant of mandamus focused on the statutory 
intent behind the Medicare Act,  which required the Secretary to provide reviews 
within the statutorily mandated 90 days.86 In further support of its argument, the 
System emphasized the “terrible choice” any provider would face when awaiting 
an administrative appeal at the ALJ level: a choice between  waiving “its right to 
due process” or  suffering “interminably until the Secretary feels like affording 
[it] a hearing.’”87 
The System’s argument fell on unsympathetic ears with the Fourth Circuit, 
in a unanimous panel opinion, agreeing with the Secretary and affirming the 
ruling below.88 In answering the System’s due process concerns that the current 
regime encourages a system where escalation is the ultimate answer to 
administrative delays, the Fourth Circuit provided an answer that may trouble 
 
 81. Id. at *4. 
 82. Cumberland Cty. Hosp. Sys., Inc. v. Burwell, 816 F.3d 48, 49 (4th Cir. 2016). 
 83. Cumberland Cty. Hosp. Sys., Inc., 816 F.3d at 50. 
 84. Id. at 50 (the Secretary initially denied over 900 claims in 2012 and 2013, and by 2014 there were 
still over 750 claims awaiting a hearing past the 90-day statutory limit). 
 85. Br. for Appellee, 9, Sept. 3, 2015. 
 86. Id. 
 87. Cumberland Cty. Hosp. Sys., Inc., 816 F.3d at 52, 55. 
 88. Id. at 57. 
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health care providers similarly situated to the System.89 Although it recognized 
that the current system was ill-equipped to handle the number of backlogged 
appeals, the court declined to compel the Secretary to amend their administrative 
functions.90 Rather, the court stated that health care providers should accept the 
delays inherent in the process and admit evidence the provider may anticipate 
needing upon escalation at the earlier appeal stages.91 The panel’s opinion 
addressed the due process concerns as it related to escalation; however, the 
opinion does not address the financial concerns of a provider being subject to 
monetary recoupments while awaiting administrative appeal. These two cases 
highlight recent litigation stemming from the issues surrounding the Medicare 
appeals backlog. The case demonstrates that, while courts have considered due 
process concerns relating to escalation as a remedy, courts have failed to consider 
the devastating financial losses suffered by providers at the sake of the appeals 
backlog. 
III. THE COURT’S REASONING 
The court in Family Rehabilitation, Inc. v. Azar held that the withholding 
of Medicare payments by federal health care programs to effectuate the 
recoupment of alleged overpayments infringes on the due process rights of a 
health care entity.92 Writing for the court, Judge Ed Kinkeade granted Family 
Rehab’s preliminary injunction.93 In doing so, the court prohibited HHS from 
continuing to withhold Medicare reimbursements in an effort to recoup payments 
from Family Rehab, while the provider was forced to wait on their subsequent 
administrative appeals with HHS.94 The court emphasized the importance and 
probative weight of the movant’s ability to demonstrate the sufficient likelihood 
it will succeed on the merits of its claim before providing injunctive relief.95 
The court cited to Matthews v. Eldridge96 and proceeded to analyze the 
three factors used by the Supreme Court in determining whether the due process 
provided by HHS was adequate.97 The court identified the disputed payments 
made for the services rendered as the exact property interest at stake in the case, 
 
 89. Id. at 55–56. 
 90. Id. 
 91. Id. 
 92. Family Rehab., Inc. v. Azar, No. 3:17-CV-3008-K, 2018 WL 3155911, at *7 (N.D. Tex. June 28, 
2018). 
 93. Family Rehab., Inc., 2018 WL 3155911 (N.D. Tex. June 28, 2018). 
 94. Family Rehab., Inc. v. Azar, No. 3:17-CV-3008-K, 2018 WL 3155911, at *7 (N.D. Tex. June 28, 
2018). 
 95. Id. 
 96. 397 U.S. 254 (1970). 
 97. Family Rehab., Inc., 2018 WL 3155911 (N.D. Tex. June 28, 2018). 
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and then it distinguished this from 6th Circuit precedent.98 The court weighed 
Family Rehab’s claim that it would go out of business before receiving the 
procedural due process it is owed in order to determine the risk of erroneous 
deprivation of resources.99 The court found it significant that Family Rehab was 
a small provider, usually serving 289 patients, and relies on Medicare 
reimbursements for services rendered for approximately 94% of its revenue 
stream.100 Due to the aggressive recoupment of overpayment, the court reasoned 
that CMS would essentially be forcing Family Rehab to subsist off only a small 
fraction of its usual revenue.101 Ultimately, the court relied upon this and the fact 
that alleged overpayments are overturned at the ALJ level 60 to 72 percent of the 
time to determine that the risks of an erroneous deprivation would be too grim.102 
For the final factor, the court determined that the defendants’ interest will not be 
adversely affected by delaying recoupment of alleged overpayments until after 
the ALJ hearing and determination.103 After weighing the relevant factors, the 
court ultimately found that the withholding of Medicare payments had 
substantially impacted Family Rehab’s business, and that the alternative 
solutions offered by HHS did not adequately protect Family Rehab’s interests.104 
The court’s subsequent grant of permanent injunction in favor of Family Rehab 
on similar grounds only further strengthens the analysis provided by the court in 
this immediate case.105 
IV. ANALYSIS 
In Family Rehabilitation, Inc. v. Azar106, the United States District Court 
for the Northern District of Texas held that the withholding of Medicare 
payments by HHS and CMS infringed on the home-health agency’s due process 
rights by failing to provide the opportunity for an evidentiary hearing before an 
Administrative Law Judge.107 The court reached the correct decision in this case 
by accurately applying Eldrige’s three-part test controlling due process 
proceedings, and by properly concluding that injunctive relief is warranted in 
situations where home-health agencies are awaiting their hearings before 
 
 98. See id. at *4 (contrasting Family Rehab’s interests in receiving the payments for treatment already 
administered with those interests of an agency in being a Medicare provider for prospective benefits in 
Cathedral Rock of North College Hill, Inc. v. Shalala). 
 99. Id. at *5. 
 100. Id. at *5. 
 101. Id. at *5. 
 102. Id. at *5. 
 103. Id. at *6. 
 104. Id. 
 105. See Family Rehab., Inc. v. Azar, 2020 WL 230615  (N.D. Tex., 2020). 
 106. Id. 
 107. Id. 
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ALJs.108 While arguments presented by HHS and CMS relied on the adequacies 
of the current administrative appeals process, the court gave an honest reading 
of the problems inherent in the waiting game effectuated by the Medicare appeals 
backlog. Furthermore, even after considering the relative precedential weight of 
a district court decision, the legal reasoning articulated in this case will provide 
a comprehensive roadmap for other health care providers bogged down in the 
appeals backlog. Finally, the court’s decision will have vast policy implications 
that will positively affect the Medicare scheme as a whole, shaping the backlog’s 
effect on the public interest and alternative strategies employed by HHS and 
CMS in reducing the backlog. 
A. The Court’s Unwillingness to Adopt Defendant’s Position Favoring 
Escalation Protects the Interests of Both Providers and the Federal Judiciary 
The court correctly rejected HHS and CMS’s arguments asserting that 
current procedures for escalating cases beyond the administrative appeals 
process  a sufficiently address the due process rights of health care providers.109 
While the regulatory framework of Medicare appeals typically involves a five-
step process, the defendants in this case would have the court effectively 
eliminate ALJ and Medicare Appeals Council review in favor of escalation.110 
Though this measure could potentially ease the administrative burden for OMHA 
and HHS, there is uncertainty as to whether escalation would accomplish the 
intended goal of reducing wait times for health care providers and beneficiaries 
in the Medicare appeals process. Further, escalation would have the effect of 
shifting the administrative burden to the federal judiciary, an empty victory that 
would only increase the caseload facing district court judges across the country. 
While statistics published in 2018 indicate that the number of filings in district 
courts declined from previous years, the federal judiciary continues to face over 
four-hundred thousand pending civil cases and criminal defendants.111 
A decision favoring escalation as a remedy to ameliorate delays in the 
Medicare appeals process would not only impose potential burdens on judicial 
economy, but would deprive providers and beneficiaries ample opportunities to 
enter evidence into the record.112 Evidentiary hearings before independent ALJs 
provide those parties appealing Medicare decisions the ability to bring their 
claims in front of professionals well-versed in the regulations governing national 
 
 108. Id. 
 109. Id. at *6. 
 110. Id. 
 111. FEDERAL JUDICIAL CASELOAD STATISTICS 2018 (2018), https://www.uscourts.gov/statistics-
reports/federal-judicial-caseload-statistics-2018. 
 112. Family Rehab., Inc. v. Azar, No. 3:17-CV-3008-K, 2018 WL 3155911 (N.D. Tex. June 28, 2018). 
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and local coverage determinations.113 While the federal judiciary may very well 
have the ability to process these Medicare appeals at an acceptable rate, the 
administrative appeals process would most effectively be reformed from the 
inside as opposed to shifting the costs outward. 
B. The Court’s Holding is Correct Because it is Consistent with Other Courts’ 
Reasoning in Due Process Proceedings and Protects Private Interests in 
Granting Injunctive Relief 
The court justifiably emphasized the dangers inherent in allowing the 
appeals process to endure for multiple years while HHS and CMS recoup the 
allegedly overdue Medicare payments from providers and beneficiaries.114 
Statutory law establishing the Medicare appeals process sets the timeline for an 
adjudication process that may take up to a year, and more pertinent to this case, 
the law also establishes a statutory deadline of ninety days for both the ALJ and 
MAC-level appeals.115 The court properly acknowledged how the changed 
timeframe may potentially impact present-day due process calculations for the 
adjudication of these claims.116 While Family Rehab and other providers are not 
overly burdened by this normal schedule for the appellate process, the court was 
correct in recognizing that “three to five years”117 is far too extensive to expect 
providers to wait in line with OMHA while their Medicare payments are 
withheld.118 
The extensive delays in the Medicare appeals process are sufficient to 
implicate both the factors for due process claims established in Eldridge and 
those identified by the Fifth Circuit in Canal Auth. of State of Fla. v. Calloway 
for determining whether to grant injunctive relief.119 These delays encourage 
providers to circumvent the statutory framework for adjudicating such disputes 
to create a secondary means of resolving claims through the federal judiciary. 
This appeals process will continue to fail providers by forcing those like Family 
Rehab to wait multiple years in a system not designed to take that long, which 
 
 113. See generally U.S.C. 42 § 1395 for statutory regulations that establish the Medicare program and 
set forth the guiding methods for bringing forward appeals. 
 114. Family Rehab., Inc., 2018 WL 3155911 (N.D. Tex. June 28, 2018). 
 115. Am. Hosp. Assoc. v. Price, 867 F.3d 160, 162–63 (D.C. Cir. 2017). 
 116. See Family Rehab., Inc., No. 3:17-CV-3008-K, 2018 WL 3155911, at *5 (N.D. Tex. June 28, 
2018) (“While the statute allows CMS to begin recouping the alleged overpayments before the ALJ 
renders a decision, Congress likely did not anticipate that decision being delayed much longer than the 
statutorily prescribed 90 days and certainly not a delay of three to five years.”). 
 117. Family Rehab., Inc. v. Azar, No. 3:17-CV-3008-K, 2018 WL 3155911, at *2 (N.D. Tex. June 28, 
2018). 
 118. Family Rehab, Inc., 2018 WL 3155911. 
 119. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976); Canal Auth. of State of Fla. v. Callaway, 489 F.2d 
567, 572 (5th Cir. 1974). 
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will drag them through a process that outgrew its original structure.120 While 
statutory guidelines sufficiently ensured the reasonable progression through the 
appeals process in the past, the court was correct to hold that the current system 
has not kept up with the demands that face OMHA and HHS.121 Though the 
delays are not fully attributable to any one factor, they seem to have been 
exacerbated by the introduction of the Medicare Recovery Audit Program.122 
This decision is part of an ongoing litigation process, and the holding should be 
considered in light of the relative precedential weight of a district court 
decision.123 However, Family Rehab’s argument is sound and may offer 
providers a framework for bringing forward further proceedings in other 
districts. 
C. The Court’s Decision Has Potential Policy Implications on the Future of the 
Medicare Program as a Whole 
In addition to posing potentially significant legal implications, the court’s 
decision also implicates broader and otherwise important policy concerns central 
to the future of the Medicare program as a whole. Specifically, the court’s 
decision will ensure protection from unjust harm for future providers that are 
similarly situated to Family Rehab. Further, the court’s decision underscores the 
inadequacy of payment recoupment as a method for remedying the Medicare 
appeals backlog. 
1. Medicare is a driving force of the American health care industry, and 
providers similarly situated as Family Rehab must be protected from unjust 
harm. 
In 2017, the federal government spent almost $600 billion on Medicare, 
roughly 3.1% of the nation’s gross domestic product.124 Further, in 2017, the 
number of beneficiaries expected to be covered by Medicare was “projected to 
cover nearly 57.7 million elderly and disabled beneficiaries, nearly one in six 
Americans.”125 These numbers illustrate the massive portion of both the overall 
economy and the United States’ population that Medicare directly affects, and 
 
 120. See Family Rehab, Inc., 2018 WL 3155911, at *5 (N.D. Tex. June 28, 2018) (stating that while 
Congress allows CMS to begin recoupment before an ALJ issues a decision, they likely did not anticipate 
the delays in the process taking so long). 
 121. Id. 
 122. Id. 
 123. The court issued another Order in October of 2018 to clarify their prior order for preliminary 
injunction in favor of Family Rehab. See Family Rehabilitation, Inc. v. Azar, 2018 WL 10419829 
(N.D.Tex., 2018). 
 124. CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, THE FEDERAL BUDGET IN 2017: AN INFOGRAPHIC (March 5, 2018), 
https://www.cbo.gov/publication/53624. 
 125. BARRY R. FURROW, ET. AL., HEALTH LAW – CASES, MATERIALS, AND PROBLEMS (West 2013). 
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demonstrates the aggregate effect that judicial decisions regarding Medicare can 
have on the country overall. 
Medicare reimbursements were crucial to Family Rehab,126 specifically in 
light of their status as a home health agency. Providers such as Family Rehab 
frequently serve a high percentage of elderly clientele, who are dependent on, or 
at least eligible for, Medicare and who prefer to stay in their homes as opposed 
to moving into assisted living centers.127 Upholding the view that Medicare 
reimbursement payments are a vital property interest will protect the due process 
rights of providers like Family Rehab and thosesimilarly situated who are 
dependent on these payments to keep their businesses afloat. 
The National Center for Health Statistics reported in 2014 that of the 
roughly 12,400 home health agencies operating in the country, 98% of the 
agencies were Medicare-certified.128 These numbers illustrate a business scheme 
that heavily involves Medicare reimbursements, and relies on the ability to 
properly navigate the administrative appeals process that accompanies Medicare 
claims and beneficiaries. The decision in Family Rehab further protects the 
property interests in these payments that providers may depend upon. If further 
adopted by the Fifth Circuit,  or on a more national scale, the holding in Family 
Rehab will ensure less burdensome claims appeals for providers like Family 
Rehab whose business models involve Medicare payments. 
2. The recoupment of Medicare payments is an ineffective means of 
eliminating the Medicare appeals backlog 
The Medicare appeals backlog is a widely known problem facing both HHS 
and the federal government, as well as the health care industry as a whole. 
Ongoing litigation focuses on different methods of eliminating the backlog, and 
recent filings may illustrate a problematic solution being proposed by the current 
administration.129 In these most recent filings from American Hospital 
Association v. Azar, HHS cites the apportionment of funds from Congress geared 
towards increasing the staffing capabilities of OMHA as being a credible solution 
for the appeals backlog.130 The funding proposals seek to increase the overall 
OMHA budget by, “a 70% increase over the amount appropriated for fiscal year 
 
 126. See Family Rehab., Inc. v. Azar, No. 3:17-CV-3008-K, 2018 WL 3155911, at *5 (N.D. Tex. June 
28, 2018) (“Family Rehab is a small home health care provider, serving 289 patients until recently, and 
relies on Medicare reimbursements for services rendered for approximately 94% of Family Rehab’s 
revenue stream.”). 
 127. L. Harris-Kojetin et al., Long-term care providers and services users in the United States: Data 
from the National Study of Long-Term Care Providers, 2013–2014, VITAL HEALTH STATS. 3(38) (2016). 
 128. Id. 
 129. See supra Section II.C. 
 130. Am. Hosp. Ass’n v. Azar, No. CV 14-851 (JEB), 2018 WL 5723141, Defendant’s Status Report 
and Response to Plaintiff’s Proposed Non-Deadline Remedies, https://www.aha.org/system/files/2018-
08/180803-ahavazar-secy-remedy-brief.pdf. 
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2017.”131 The increased apportionment of funds is an encouraging sign that the 
different branches of government are attempting to fix the solution outside of a 
federal courtroom and shows promise that Congress is willing to seriously work 
towards eliminating the backlog. However, this massive budget apportionment 
to OMHA may be a shortsighted, inadequate strategy and, ultimately, a largely 
pyric victory. 
OMHA is just the third stage in the Medicare appeals process, with a 
statutory right to appeal ALJ decisions issued by OMHA to the DAB.132 While 
the figures are more staggering for the number of appeals awaiting to be 
adjudicated at the OMHA level, a considerable backlog at the DAB level 
remains.133 If OMHA is able to use its new budgetary apportionment to increase 
the number of decisions it is able to produce, it may not be a surprise to some 
that the number of appeals of ALJ decisions could increase.134 The increased 
productivity of OMHA will likely benefit providers such as Family Rehab who 
have their claims adjudicated through an evidentiary hearing before an ALJ. It 
may even prove contradictory to this court’s holding, in that providers may no 
longer be harmed by escalating their appeals up through the system if they are 
actually able to sit for an evidentiary hearing.135 
Nonetheless, this increase in adjudicatory efficiency at one level of the 
Medicare appeals chain must be met with increased efficiency at the requisite 
step in the appeals process. While the increased productivity of OMHA may 
allow more evidentiary hearings to take place, the court’s holding that Congress 
did not intend for the escalation process to become mandatory is still relevant.136 
Lessening the damage rendered through an approach centered on escalation fails 
to address the root issues at play in the Medicare Act’s language. If a health care 
provider has the opportunity for at least an evidentiary hearing before an ALJ 
prior to getting back in line to wait to appeal that same ALJ’s ruling to the DAB, 
the provider still remains stuck in the administrative system. 
The increased budgetary apportionment for OMHA may not achieve the 
overall goals that HHS is ultimately trying to accomplish in truly eliminating the 
 
 131. Id. 
 132. See 42 U.S.C. § 405.1395. 
 133. U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., HHS PRIMER: THE MEDICARE. 
APPEALS PROCESS 3 (2015), https://www.hhs.gov/dab/medicare-appeals-backlog.pdf (“As a result, as of 
the end of FY 2015, 884,017 appeals were waiting to be adjudicated by 
OMHA and 14,874 appeals were waiting to be reviewed at the Council. Under current resources (and 
without any additional appeals), it would take 11 years for OMHA and 6 years for the Council to process 
their respective backlogs. 
 134. Am. Hosp. Ass’n v. Azar, No. CV 14-851 (JEB), 2018 WL 5723141, Defendant’s Status Report 
and Response to Plaintiff’s Proposed Non-Deadline Remedies, https://www.aha.org/system/files/2018-
08/180803-ahavazar-secy-remedy-brief.pdf (2018). 
 135. See supra Section III. 
 136. See supra Section III. 
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backlog. This conclusion may not be realized, and it is presently impossible to 
do anything more than speculate on the actual results of this budgetary increase. 
This does provide hope that the legislative and executive branches may look to 
further increase their pragmatic approach to solving this problem. 
V. CONCLUSION 
In Family Rehabilitation, Inc. v. Azar137, the United States District Court 
for the Northern District of Texas addressed issues facing health care suppliers 
and the administration of Medicare payments. In the June 2018 opinion, the court 
concluded that the plaintiff, Family Rehabilitation Clinic, demonstrated both the 
required standards for a procedural due process claim and the threat of 
“irreparable harm”, and thus granted their motion for a preliminary injunction.138 
The court’s decision was correct and implicates policy concerns that may not be 
addressed by simply throwing more money at the problem through simply 
increasing funding to the Office of Medicare Hearings and Appeals.139 The court 
correctly held that Medicare payments are a property interest in the context of 
due process proceedings, and thus ensured protections for health care providers 
who base their business models on these payments.140 It remains important to see 
how the case unfolds, but this seemingly innocuous slip opinion may very well 
serve to protect health care providers mired in the Medicare appeals process and 
illustrate the means by which providers in other Federal districts may protect 
themselves from HHS’s improper means of recoupment during post-payment 
reviews.141 
 
 
 137. No. 3:17-CV-3008-K, 2018 WL 3155911, (N.D. Tex. June 28, 2018). 
 138. Family Rehab., Inc., 2018 WL 3155911. 
 139. See supra Section IV.C. 
 140. See supra Section IV.A. 
 141. See supra Section IV.B. 
